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Hiding Comms in Plain Sight
Mesh networking effects can conceal 
C2 efforts in congested littoral environments. 
BY ALEXANDER BORDETSKY, STEPHEN BENSON AND WAYNE P. HUGHES
A s the U.S. Navy embraces its evolving “forward ... from the sea” strategic concept in a post-Cold War geopoliti-
cal reality, it is operating more in con-
tested littorals and facing increasingly 
compressed decision cycles. Sanctuar-
ies sanitized of threats have become 
the exception, not the rule. As a result, 
the sea service has emerged as a global 
enforcer—combating pirates, taking out 
terrorists and responding to disaster-
ravaged areas—a role that has brought 
its missions closer to coastlines.
Conflict in confined, cluttered lit-
toral waters, where defensive and 
offensive measures are much harder 
to carry out than in the open seas, 
has complicated naval warfare. That 
said, there is a silver lining to this 
cloud. Physical and electromagnetic 
concealment are easier in these teem-
ing coastal waters, achievable with 
practice when aided by a technical 
and tactical advancement called mesh 
networking.
Mesh networks in the littorals sus-
tain command and control (C2) and 
maintain reliable and agile connec-
tions. By serving as critical nodes in 
this type of network, small surface 
vessels in a class known as the littoral 
combat ship (LCS) can support mis-
sions with other vessels and aircraft, 
both manned and unmanned, and 
take on new operational roles.
The presence and usage of four 
major types of critical networking 
nodes typically guide the configu-
ration of information networks and 
their decision-making variants. These 
nodes include hubs, bridges, routers 
and gateways, all in a hierarchy of pro-
tocol layers to capitalize on the use 
of stratified nodes performing across 
a scaled mesh of links. Because LCS 
vessels are so versatile, they can serve 
as any of these node types, based on 
rapid switching, to carry out the mis-
sion at hand. Additionally, their ver-
satility enables the delegation of some 
of these mission roles to nearby or 
remote vessels, depending on opera-
tional needs.
A multilayered mesh network 
capability adds agility and intermit-
tency throughout the compressed 
The littoral combat ship (LCS) USS Independence sets sail 
in 2009 during builder’s trials—the first opportunity for the 
shipbuilder and the U.S. Navy to operate the ship at sea.
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NETWORKING
sense-decide-act (SDA) cycle that 
makes up robotic systems’ primary 
functions. We coined the phrase “net-
works that don’t exist” to illustrate how 
advanced techniques, such as burst 
communications, make mesh networks, 
ships and aircraft much less visible to 
adversaries and protect C2 from coun-
termeasures. New tactics, coupled with 
these techniques, will help a distributed 
lethal force carry out surprise attacks—
from a relatively short range. Networks 
that don’t exist will reduce the need to 
operate in a constant, detectable elec-
tronic time and space continuum. Fast-
moving human operators, sensors and 
unmanned systems can run them with 
limited transmissions in highly discrete 
moments of time and space. As a result, 
undetectable mesh networks can deliver 
a significant amount of time-sensitive 
information while platforms and oper-
ators rapidly change locations. These 
networks both conceal and deceive in 
the cyber and physical clutter of the 
littorals.
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 
research teams have refined techniques 
that use discrete time and space net-
working to take advantage of land-, 
sea- and space-based assets and tech-
nologies. One solution, Networking-
by-Touch (NbT), is used in urban and 
maritime environments to leverage 
social networking to deliver messages 
or share data when continuous, on-
the-move broadband communications 
might be subject to enemy intercep-
tion. The proliferation of near-field and 
Bluetooth-enabled commercial smart-
phones lets one NPS team explore 
NbT with swimmers and divers who 
communicate underwater via wrist-
worn devices. In addition, scientists 
are examining the technology when 
used with fast unmanned vehicles 
and manned boats in close quarters, 
approximating littoral combat clutter.
NPS studies also revealed another 
example of a network that doesn’t 
exist in projectile-based networking, 
which could even be applied to naval 
gunfire systems. Scientists looked at 
projectile-based nodes such as the 
Rafael-developed Firefly, a grenade-
type device that provides two-way 
communications in flight every four 
to eight seconds. These elevated nodes 
transmit data at a high speed with no 
humans present and no support from 
a networking infrastructure. The signal 
from a camera is sent back to a hand-
held computer for storage and analysis. 
Space-based solutions offer a new 
paradigm in the orbital domain as well. 
These entail formations of several low-
orbit cube satellites and picosatellites 
that collect and download data in five- 
to seven-minute intervals.
The interplay of NbT, projectile-
based nodes and cube satellite forma-
tions creates a fairly complex pattern 
of discrete networking in time and 
physical space. When combined with 
highly directional and intermittent 
radio links, the mesh network deliv-
ers far more secure, less detectable but 
efficient C2 infrastructure for the lower 
layers of the Open Systems Intercon-
nection (OSI) stack—ground and air 
manned and unmanned platforms. 
Because cyber components continu-
ously carry data, cyber-based networks 
that don’t exist could provide nearly 
undetectable C2 while confounding the 
enemy.
Suppose sailors must quickly exe-
cute the “sense” phase of the C2 cycle. 
In this case, the LCS needed for the 
mission is a hub type, and it activates 
A U.S. sailor signals an MH-60R Seahawk helicopter 
aboard the USS Fort Worth (LCS 3) during a vertical 
replenishment mission in November 2015. 
The LCS USS Independence conducts 
maneuvers with the aircraft carrier USS Ronald 
Reagan (CVN 76) during Rim of the Pacific 2014. 
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for data collection a network that 
doesn’t exist by shooting projectiles 
with mesh networking sensor and 
NbT payloads. The payloads transfer 
surveillance data in burst transmis-
sions received by the hub via periodic 
moments of cube satellite orbital node 
availability, unmanned surface vessels, 
fast patrol boats and unmanned 
ground vehicles, all in a coordinated 
dance. Within four to eight seconds, 
the projectiles recede from view, and 
the enemy only vaguely knows the 
general LCS location.
In general, an LCS force operat-
ing in cyberspace combines physical 
and cyber maneuvering to achieve 
better attack and defensive positions 
and make up a better network. For 
the most part, ship-to-ship network-
ing is dominated by omnidirectional 
communications. In a cluttered littoral 
environment, when enemy attack or 
unintentional neutral or friendly force 
interference is highly probable, direc-
tional links could make the difference 
between success and failure.
Re lat ive ly  swi f t  LCS move-
ments accompanied by manned and 
unmanned systems provide a tradi-
tional type of maneuver that creates a 
nontraditional function: an additional 
set of virtually undetectable relays and 
new links to support vessels exchang-
ing critical attack data. Within a few 
minutes, the location of the LCS 
changes, confusing an adversary by 
suddenly appearing as a seemingly 
new threat somewhere else. Fast move-
ment and grouping in tight clusters 
cause a temporary high data transfer 
rate, which in turn generates what are 
called cyberspace “honey pots” that 
provide deceiving countermeasures 
that can foil cyber or kinetic attacks.
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